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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-BUSINESS NECESSITY AND
BFOQ EXCEPTIONS TO TITLE VII EXTENDED TO UNMARRIED,
PREGNANT YOUTH SERVICES WORKERS SERVING AS ROLE MOD-
ELS. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.
1987).
The Omaha Girls Club (OGC) is a private club organized to help
girls ages 8 to 18 "maximize their life opportunities."1 One of OGC's
goals is pregnancy prevention, because it sees pregnancy as limiting
the opportunities for its young members. OGC emphasizes the devel-
opment of close relationships between staff and members and trains
its staff to act as role models for its members as a means of fulfilling
its mission. Pursuant to this approach, OGC adopted a "role model
rule" forbidding single parent pregnancies among its staff members.2
Crystal Chambers, a single black woman, worked as an arts and
crafts instructor at the North Girls Club, a facility of OGC.3 She was
discharged for violation of OGC's "role model rule" when she became
pregnant. Chambers challenged the firing for her unmarried preg-
nancy by filing suit in federal district court in Nebraska.4 She brought
suit under several theories, including violation of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.' Except for the title VII claim based
1. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1987).
2. The OGC's personnel policies state:
MAJOR CLUB RULES
All persons employed by the Girls Club of Omaha are subject to the rules and regula-
tions as established by the Board of Directors. The following are not permitted and
such acts may result in immediate discharge:
11. Negative role modeling for Girls Club Members to include such things as single
parent pregnancies.
Id. at 699 n.2.
3. An amicus curiae brief for the plaintiff/appellant points out that Chambers' employ-
ment with OGC was only part time. Brief of The Sisterhood of Black Single Mothers, The
American Civil Liberties Union, The Nebraska Civil Liberties Union, and The Center for
Constitutional Rights as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 1, Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1447).
4. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 834
F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -17 (1982); 5 U.S.C. §§ 2204-05 (repealed
1964)) [hereinafter title VII].
Chambers also filed claims for violations of her rights under the first, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution and under civil rights statutes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. She filed state law claims for bad faith discharge, defamation,
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on sex and race discrimination, the district court dismissed all her
claims before trial or at the end of her case in chief. The court ruled
against Chambers on the title VII claim after a full trial.6
The court found that the title VII claim presented a prima facie
case of combined race and sex discrimination under both the dispa-
rate treatment 7 and disparate impact' theories of recovery. 9 However,
it further found that OGC successfully rebutted Chambers' case
under both theories, articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for discharging her under the former theory 10 and proving a busi-
ness necessity for the role model rule with respect to the latter."I
On appeal, Chambers contended that OGC based the role model
rule upon its own speculation and presented no validation studies to
show that the rule prevented pregnancies among OGC's members.' 2
She also argued that the court should not have applied disparate treat-
ment analysis to her case because discharge on account of pregnancy,
without further analysis, constitutes intentional sex discrimination.' 3
Finally, she argued the role model rule could not be justified as a bona
fide occupational qualification (bfoq) which would bring it within the
statutory exception for intentional discrimination.' 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's factual findings as not clearly erroneous.' 5
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intimidation, and conspiracy to
deprive her of her livelihood. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 925, 929 (D.
Neb. 1986).
6. 629 F. Supp. at 951-52.
7. The disparate treatment theory of recovery applies when an employer treats some
people differently from others based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See infra
text accompanying notes 22-43.
8. Disparate impact analysis applies when an employer's apparently neutral practice has
a disproportionate effect upon one of the groups protected by title VII. See infra text accom-
panying notes 44-54.
9. 629 F. Supp. at 947, 949.
10. Id. at 947.
11. Id. at 950.
12. 834 F.2d at 702.
13. Id. at 703. The shifting burdens of proof used in disparate treatment analysis to deter-
mine whether a defendant intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff for reasons prohibited
by title VII do not apply when the employment discrimination is openly based upon one of the
prohibited reasons. See infra text accompanying notes 24-34.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982) provides, in relevant part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and em-
ploy employees, . . . on the basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise.
15. The court noted that the standard of review for business necessity determinations in
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It further found that OGC's role model rule was justified as a bfoq, as
well as a business necessity.' 6 Chambers petitioned the court of ap-
peals for a rehearing en banc. The majority of the court denied her
petition with three judges dissenting.'" Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.'I
Courts have developed two major theories of discrimination under ti-
tle VII-disparate treatment and disparate impact.19 Although the
theories are quite distinct in principle,2 ° courts have treated them as
overlapping one another in application.21
disparate impact cases is the clearly erroneous standard applied to factual findings. 834 F.2d
at 702 (citing Reddemann v. Minnesota Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., 811 F.2d 1208, 1209
(8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir.
1983); FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a)).
Under the clearly erroneous standard of review an appellate court may reverse a lower
court's factual findings only if the appellate court is" 'left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.' " Chambers, 834 F.2d at 702 (citing Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948))).
16. 834 F.2d at 705. Although the district court had not found the role model rule was
justified as a bfoq, the appellate court found that the factual findings relevant to establishing a
bfoq were the same as those supporting the finding that the rule was justified as a business
necessity.
17. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1988). Circuit Judge C.
Arlen Beam, who was chief judge of the Nebraska District Court and decided the case at that
level, did not participate in the vote for rehearing en banc.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
19. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1286-1394 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN (2d ed. 1983)].
20. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: RACE, RELIGION,
AND NATIONAL ORIGIN § 72.10 (1987) [hereinafter 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON]; see also
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
21. Courts often apply disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis to the same set
of facts. See, e.g., Jones v. International Paper Co., 720 F.2d 496, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1983). See
also Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1984); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 310-11 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN (Supp. 1985)].
Courts apply the same standards to bfoq and business necessity defenses under the respec-
tive theories. Compare Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 1983)
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Disparate treatment occurs where
[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof
of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situa-
tions be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.22
There are two types of disparate treatment cases-facial discrimina-
tion and pretext.23 Facial discrimination involves an overtly discrimi-
natory rule or policy by which an employer explicitly treats some
employees differently from others on the basis of one of the classifica-
tions prohibited by title VII. 24 The employer's act of classifying em-
ployees on a prohibited basis establishes intent.25 The only defense to
facial discrimination is the affirmative defense of the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (bfoq) 26 provided in section 2000e-2(e)(l) of title
VII.2 7
Courts interpret the bfoq exception narrowly. 28 The Supreme
Court has applied the bfoq exception to sex discrimination in only one
case, Dothard v. Rawlinson.29 At issue in this case was an Alabama
Board of Corrections administrative regulation that prohibited wo-
men from working in positions which brought them in contact with
maximum security male inmates. In holding that the exception is to
be interpreted narrowly, the Court noted the requirement from a
lower court decision that an employer relying on the bfoq defense
must prove "that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual
basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable
to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." 30 The
(business necessity) with Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (bfoq) (both applying "manifest relationship" stan-
dard). See also Gunther, 612 F.2d at 1086 n.8 (bfoq analysis "similar to and overlaps with the
judicially created 'business necessity' test").
22. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
23. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Wil-
liams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection With
Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 673-82 (1981) [hereinafter
Williams]). See also Note, Title VII and Exclusionary Employment Practices: Fertile and
Pregnant Women Need Not Apply, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 95, 106 (1985).
24. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547; Williams, supra note 23, at 668; Note, supra note 23, at 106
n.61.
25. Williams, supra note 23, at 669 n.176; Note, supra note 23, at 106 n.61.
26. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547; Williams, supra note 23, at 668; Note, supra note 23, at 106.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
28. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); Gunther v. Iowa State
Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334).
29. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
30. Id. at 333 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th
420 [Vol. 11:417
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Court then held that, based upon "the particular factual circum-
stances of this case,"31 the regulation which excluded females from
contact positions in maximum security prisons was justified as a
bfoq.3 2 The Court relied upon opinion testimony from both the plain-
tiff's and the defendant's expert witnesses to establish that, under the
conditions existing in the Alabama maximum-security male peniten-
tiaries,33 the very sex of a female guard would diminish her ability to
perform the essence of her job, which is keeping order in the prisons.34
The second type of disparate treatment theory applies when an
employer takes some apparently neutral action, or adopts an ostensi-
bly neutral policy, which the plaintiff alleges is a pretext for prohib-
Cir. 1969)). Two tests with respect to ability to perform had emerged in prior case law. Ro-
senfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971) and Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969) restricted the use of the bfoq exception to
sexual characteristics rather than characteristics which, to some degree, correlate with a par-
ticular sex. Both defendants restricted certain jobs to men only, based upon assumptions about
the lesser strength of women. In such cases an employer must administer individualized tests
to determine ability to perform. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235, set out the less restrictive test quoted
by the Dothard Court. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN (2d ed. 1983), supra note 19, at 348.
Although it quoted a requirement for a "factual basis," the Dothard Court spoke in terms
of probabilities. For example, the Court wrote that "[a] woman's relative ability to maintain
order... could be directly reduced by her womanhood;" that while there is a "basis in fact" it
is an "[expectation] that sex offenders.., would be moved to [assault women] again;" and that
there is a "likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman.... " 433
U.S. at 335-36 (emphasis added). See Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification:
Defining Title VII's Evolving Enigma, Related Litigation Problems, and the Judicial Vision of
Womanhood after Dothard v. Rawlinson, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107, 134 n.229 (1979).
The Court noted that the district court held, in effect, that the challenged regulation was
based on stereotyped assumptions about women's ability to perform as guards in male prisons.
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334. The Court was careful to point out that it did not question women's
abilities as prison guards under normal conditions. Id. at 336 nn.23-24.
The Court found a basis for support of the regulation other than a stereotyped belief that
women are unable to adequately perform prison guard duties. Rather, it found that the inevi-
table incidents of assault that would be triggered by a woman's sexuality would pose a threat
to prison security, given the unstable conditions in the male maximum security facilities.
Note, supra at 138 n.261.
31. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334. The Court found there were "few visible deterrents to
inmate assaults on women custodians." Id. at 336. Inmate access to guards was made easier
by dormitory living arrangements. The institutions were understaffed. Id. An estimated 20%
of the male prison population was sex offenders mixed in with the rest of the population in the
dormitory facilities. Id. at 335.
A federal district court had held that the conditions of confinement in Alabama's prisons
were characterized by "rampant violence" and a "jungle atmosphere" and were constitution-
ally intolerable. Id. at 334 (citing Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1977).
32. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336-37.
33. Id. at 336.
34. Id. In Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), the court
set out the requirement that the bfoq applied "only when the essence of the business operation
would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively." That court applied a
"business necessity test, not a business convenience test." Id.
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ited discrimination.35 The Supreme Court has articulated the order
and allocation of proof for analysis of pretext cases.36 The plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination prohibited by title
VII.37 The burden of production then shifts to the defendant "to ar-
ticulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action
against the plaintiff.38 The plaintiff may then show that the defend-
ant's reasons were a pretext for statutorily prohibited discrimina-
tion.3 9 The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff
throughout the disparate treatment pretext analysis.'
Shifting the burdens of production insures that a plaintiff has the
opportunity to show the defendant's discriminatory intent even
though he has no direct evidence of it.4 Hence, the shifting burdens
do not apply when a plaintiff presents direct evidence of the defend-
ant's illegal discrimination.42 In the face of direct evidence of its dis-
criminatory intent, the defendant has the burden of proving an
affirmative bfoq defense for its challenged policy or action.43
The second major theory of recovery under title VII, disparate
impact, also involves apparently neutral employment practices and
35. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984); Williams,
supra note 23, at 668; Note, supra note 23, at 107.
36. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas was a
failure to rehire case. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
the Court applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis to a discharge case and further refined the
allocations of proof.
37. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54.
38. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. When the plaintiff has
met her initial burden, a presumption is created. The burden which shifts to the defendant is
that of rebutting the presumption by coming forward with enough evidence to create a genuine
issue of fact regarding whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. The defendant does not
have to persuade the court that the articulated reason(s) actually motivated it. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254-55.
39. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
40. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 256.
41. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (citing Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)). See also Burdine, 450 U.S. 255-56 (shift-
ing burdens clarifies the factual issue so that "plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext.").
42. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121 (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977)); see also Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d
643, 648 (1987) and B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN (Supp. 1985), supra note 21, at 301.
Thurston involved an action brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982). In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)
the Court found that the substantive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba
from Title VII." Id.
43. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121; Carney, 824 F.2d at 648 and 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: SEX § 12.11 at 3-24 (1987) [hereinafter I A. LARSON & L.
LARSON].
422
1988-89] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
shifting burdens of producing evidence." Again, the analysis has
three parts.45 However, analysis here focuses on the impact or conse-
quences of the challenged practice rather than the defendant's motives
for it. 4 6 The plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of adverse impact.47 Once adverse impact is established, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the practice is justified as
job-related or as a business necessity.41 If business necessity is estab-
lished, the plaintiff has the burden to show the existence of alternative
practices which would serve the defendant's needs with a less discrim-
inatory impact.49
At the stage of the disparate impact theory in which the burden
of proof shifts to the defendant, the Court created the business neces-
sity defense.5" Because business necessity is a defense, the defendant
bears a heavy burden of production at this stage of the analysis.5"
44. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
45. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Moody, 422 U.S. at 425.
Schlei & Grossman emphasize that "the Griggs/Albemarle formula is an analytical tool
for evaluating evidence and not a three-step procedure by which evidence is presented. Thus,
in considering whether or not one side or the other has satisfied its burden at particular steps,
the court will consider evidence relevant to that step offered by both plaintiff and defendant."
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN (2d ed. 1983), supra note 19, at 1325.
The same is also true of the three-part formula for disparate treatment analysis. See
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN (2d ed.
1983), supra note 19, at 1321.
46. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15; see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("Congress di-
rected the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation.").
47. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Moody, 422 U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
48. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Moody, 422 U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("[T]he
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Ne-
groes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."). See also
Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at
431).
49. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Moody, 422 U.S. at 425.
50. The Griggs Court, and other courts since, have used the terms business necessity and
job-related interchangeably. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN (2d ed. 1983), supra note 19, at 1329.
Furthermore, courts have defined business necessity in several ways. The Court in
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14 found that "a discriminatory employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge,"
must be "essential to effective job performance," and "essential to good job performance." Id.
In Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432, the Court held that the employer must show the challenged job
requirement had a "manifest relationship to the employment in question" and found that the
employer had not shown that the challenged job requirement bore "a demonstrable relation-
ship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." Id. In Kirby v. Colony
Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980), the Eighth Circuit found "the proper
standard is ... whether there is a compelling need for the employer to maintain that practice
and whether the employer can prove there is no alternative to the challenged practice." Id.
51. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d at 815 (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329)
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With respect to proof at this stage, the Court has required the em-
ployer to show job-relatedness by use of validation studies when the
challenged practice is a scored test or requirement of a high school
diploma.12 However, when the challenged practice involves other ob-
jective job criteria for professional or highly skilled jobs, lower courts
have not insisted upon validation studies to show the job-relatedness
of the criteria.5 3 Even so, the proof must consist of more than the
conclusory testimony of the defendant's employees.54
Courts have analyzed cases involving discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy under both of the major title VII theories of recovery. 55
Consistent with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) guidelines, 6 lower federal courts in the early 1970s found
(The defendant must demonstrate that the job requirement had "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."); Hawkins, 697 F.2d at 815 (quoting Kirby v. Colony Furniture, 613
F.2d 696, 706 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980)) ("A discriminatory employment practice cannot be 'justified
by routine business considerations;' the employer must demonstrate that there is a 'compelling
need... to maintain that practice.' "). See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN (2d ed. 1983),
supra note 19, at 1328.
The evidentiary burden in the second part of the disparate impact analysis is greater than
it is in the second part of disparate treatment pretext analysis. See, e.g., Williams v. Colorado
Springs School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) ('[I]n a disparate impact case, unlike
a disparate treatment case, a rational or legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is insufficient.
The practice must be essential, the purpose compelling.").
The question of whether the defendant's burden is a burden of persuasion or simply one of
producing evidence is open. Until recently, the Court had cast the burden of persuasion upon
the defendant. See, e.g., Moody, 422 U.S. at 425 (defendant must "meet the burden of proving
that its tests are 'job-related' "); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (defendant must "prov[e] that the
challenged requirements are job related"). However, the Court's recent plurality decision cre-
ates doubt as to what burden future defendants will carry-persuasion or production. Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988) ("[T]he ultimate burden of proving
that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment prac-
tice remains with the plaintiff at all times.").
52. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (job requirements adopted "without meaningful study of their
relationship to job-performance ability"); Moody, 422 U.S. at 425, 431-32 (employer's valida-
tion studies inadequate when measured against guidelines for validation studies issued by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)). See also, 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON,
supra note 20, at § 72.10, 14-5 to 14-6 (issue of business necessity in testing cases almost exclu-
sively an inquiry whether tests have been adequately validated for job-relatedness).
53. See, e.g., Hawkins, 697 F.2d at 815-16 (validation study not required to show job-
relatedness of college degree to trade returns supervisor job); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.,
475 F.2d 216, 218-19 (10th Cir. 1972) (job-relatedness of requirement of 500 flight hours estab-
lished by statistics showing applicants with higher flight hours more likely to succeed in pilot
training program).
54. Hawkins, 697 F.2d at 815 (lengthy testimony by company personnel concerning why
college degree requirement was job-related showed business necessity).
55. Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title
VII: Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 591, 595-97 (1982).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973). EEOC guidelines issued in 1972 declared that pregnancy
constitutes a temporary disability for all employment purposes. After Congress passed the
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that employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constituted
disparate treatment and was prohibited by title VII.57 However, in
1976 the Supreme Court applied the disparate impact theory in Gen-
eral Electric Company v. Gilbert58 to uphold an employer's disability
benefits plan which excluded pregnancy but paid benefits for other
nonoccupational disabilities. The Court held that pregnancy-based
differentiation was not sex discrimination because it produced catego-
ries of pregnant and nonpregnant persons. The nonpregnant category
included both men and women.59 Analyzing the challenged policy as
a facially neutral one, the Court found that the female plaintiffs had
not shown the gender-based effects necessary to make out a prima
facie case under the disparate treatment theory.6°
In response to the Court's decision in Gilbert, Congress passed
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).61  The PDA
amended title VII to specifically include pregnancy discrimination in
the definition of discrimination on the basis of sex. 62 The House La-
bor and Education Committee specifically approved the EEOC guide-
lines, which the majority of the Court had rejected.63 The Committee
stated that the Act clarified Congress' original intent "to ensure that
working women are protected against all forms of employment dis-
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the EEOC issued new guidelines which are almost identical to
the earlier ones. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1986) provides, in part, that a written or unwritten
employment policy or practice which excludes applicants because of pregnancy is a prima facie
violation of title VII. Furthermore, disability insurance, sick leave, leave duration, seniority,
and reinstatement must apply to pregnancy on the same terms as they are applied to other
disabilities.
57. Eighteen federal district courts and seven federal courts of appeals had rendered deci-
sions prohibiting discrimination in employment based on pregnancy before 1976. H.R. REP.
No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749,
4750 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
58. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
59. Id. at 133-34.
60. Id. at 137.
61. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 57, at 2-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 4750-53.
62. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-55, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1977)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)) [hereinafter PDA].
The PDA provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work ....
63. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 57, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 4750.
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crimination based on sex."' Congress' original intent was also to
prevent discrimination against women in employment "based on ster-
eotyped characterizations of the sexes. "65
After Congress passed the PDA, the Supreme Court held the Act
"made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a
woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her
sex." 66 Because discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is now facial
discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show
that such discrimination is justified as a bfoq in the circumstances of
the particular employment at issue.6 7 Since passage of the PDA,
courts have considered nonpregnancy as a bfoq in the circumstances
of the employment of airline flight attendants and of workers in envi-
ronments which may be hazardous to fetuses. In both circumstances,
employers seek to justify exclusion of pregnant workers on the basis of
safety concerns.
In Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.68 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit found that concerns for passenger safety in
emergency situations justified the exclusion of pregnant workers from
the job of flight attendant. The court held that a discriminatory pol-
icy must address the essence of an employer's business to be justified
as a bfoq.69 It found that passenger safety was the essence of the de-
fendant airline's business because of its commitment to safety. 70 Tes-
timony of medical experts established that pregnant women are
subject to pregnancy-related ailments which can render them unable
to perform routine safety duties in emergencies. 71 The court acknowl-
edged that many pregnant women do not suffer such disabilities.
Nevertheless, it found that the impossibility of predicting which wo-
men will suffer pregnancy-related disabilities and the magnitude of
64. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4751.
65. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545, 546 n.3 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (quoting EEOC Guideline now codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1988)).
66. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
67. 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 43, at 3-22.
68. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (1984). See also Harriss v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 677 (1980) (finding that, after Congress passed PDA,
airline policy excluding pregnant women from flight attendant work was justified as a bfoq
because of the significant safety risk to passengers).
69. Levin, 730 F.2d at 997.
70. Id. at 999.
71. Id. at 997. Defendant's medical experts testified that pregnant women are subject to
spontaneous abortion, nausea, and fatigue. Plaintiff's experts did not dispute that these ail-
ments could impair the ability of a pregnant attendant to perform safety duties but argued that
the likelihood of a pregnant flight attendant being incapacitated at the same time that an emer-
gency occurred was infinitesimally small. Id.
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the risk to passengers justified excluding all pregnant attendants from
flight duties.72
Employers have also advanced concerns for the safety of the un-
born child of pregnant workers as justification for excluding pregnant
employees from certain jobs.73 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit set out a framework for analysis of fetal pro-
tection cases in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital 74 The court be-
gan its analysis by establishing a rebuttable presumption that fetal
protection policies which apply only to women are facially discrimi-
natory. 75 To rebut the presumption, the court required that a defend-
ant must produce objective scientific evidence supported by opinion
evidence of experts in the relevant scientific fields to prove there is a
substantial risk of harm to the fetus.76 If the defendant does not rebut
the presumption of facial discrimination, its only defense is a bfoq.
The court held that there is no defense to a facially discriminatory
fetal protection policy "unless the employer shows a direct relation-
ship between the policy and the actual ability of a pregnant or fertile
female to perform her job." 7 7
When an employer discriminates against a female employee be-
cause she is unmarried as well as pregnant, the analysis remains the
same. Although title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the ba-
sis of marital status, when marital status is combined with pregnancy
72. Id. at 998.
73. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg
County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).
74. 726 F.2d 1543 (5th Cir. 1984). See also EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) 4318
(Oct. 7, 1988) (setting forth an analytical framework based on Hayes and Wright for determin-
ing when exclusionary fetal protection policies violate title VII).
75. Id. at 1548.
76. Id. If the defendant carries the threshold burden of proving significant risk of harm to
the fetus, it must then prove, also with scientific evidence, that the risk does not also apply to
the offspring of male employees. When scientific evidence concerning the risk to men does not
exist, an employer may adopt a suitable policy aimed only at women. Id. at 1548-49.
A defendant which successfully rebuts the initial presumption of facial discrimination has,
in effect, proven its fetal protection policy is neutral because it protects equally the offspring of
both men and women employees. However, the policy has a disparate impact on women be-
cause it affects only them. Therefore, the plaintiff has an automatic prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact for which the defendant is entitled to assert a business necessity defense. Under
traditional title VII analysis, the employer must prove business necessity by showing its policy
is related to job performance. Because a fetal protection policy has nothing to do with job
performance, the employer in such a case would not be able to make the required showing.
For public policy reasons, the Hayes court held that employers in fetal protection cases will be
allowed the business necessity defense. Its defense is automatic in such a situation because the
employer has already proved, to rebut the presumption of facial discrimination, that its policy
is justified on a scientific basis and addresses a harm that affects only women. Id. at 1552-53.
77. Id. at 1549.
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as the basis for the discrimination, courts have held that the combina-
tion violates title VII.78 Unwed pregnancy has been the basis for dis-
crimination in several cases involving teachers or counselors. 79 Two
of these cases involved public school defendants and were, therefore,
decided under the Constitution. 0 In these cases, the schools offered
role modeling as justification for their discriminatory actions against
the unmarried pregnant teachers."1 The courts rejected the role
model defense under equal protection analysis.82
In a third public school case, Ponton v. Newport News School
Board,83 the plaintiff teacher brought her case under title VII, as well
as the Constitution. The defendant had forced the plaintiff to take
leave after it learned she was pregnant but unmarried. It did not hold
her position for her, but allowed her to return two years later when
another position for which she was qualified became available.8 4 The
court first decided the plaintiff's constitutional claim, weighing her
right to privacy against the public employer's asserted interest in
"protecting schoolchildren from exposure to a single, pregnant
teacher." '85 Without referring to any evidence presented, the court
found that students' knowledge that plaintiff was unmarried would
have "a fairly minimal impact on them."86 The court further found
78. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
917 (1977) (executive secretary demoted to a clerical position because of her out-of-wedlock
pregnancy, and was effectively discharged on the basis of a classification which had no rational
relationship to business necessity); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan.
1971) (because unwed pregnancy did not adversely affect her job performance, hospital busi-
ness office worker's discharge for her failure to notify the employer of her condition violated
title VII).
79. Avery v. Homewood City Bd. of Educ., 674 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982); Andrews v.
Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975); Ponton v. Newport News
School Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1986).
80. Avery, 674 F.2d 337; Andrews, 507 F.2d 611.
81. Avery, 674 F.2d at 341; Andrews, 507 F.2d at 614.
82. Avery, 674 F.2d at 341 (asserted role model defense violated rights under equal protec-
tion clause of fourteenth amendment for the same reasons as the court rejected the defense in
Andrews); Andrews, 507 F.2d at 616 (quoting Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist.,
371 F. Supp. 27, 35 (1973)) (role model defense violated equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because "the likelihood of inferred learning that unwed parenthood is nec-
essarily good or praiseworthy, is highly improbable, if not speculative").
83. 632 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1986).
84. Id. at 1059-60. Married pregnant teachers were given the option of taking a disability
leave which allowed them to work until they were physically unable to do so and guaranteed
them their former jobs when they returned. Id. at 1059. The school district contended the
plaintiff elected to take parental leave rather than disability leave. Id. at 1060. However, the
court found the preponderance of the evidence showed she was forced to take immediate,
indefinite leave because she was single and pregnant. Id. at 1060-61.
85. Id. at 1062.
86. Id. at 1063.
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there was no danger that the plaintiff's single, pregnant status could
be perceived as representing the school board's advocacy of unwed
pregnancy.87 Hence, the court held that the school district violated
plaintiff's right to privacy when it forced her to take leave because the
state interest asserted did not outweigh her constitutional right of
privacy. 8
As for her title VII claim, the court found the plaintiff had
proved a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing she was
forced to take leave because she was pregnant.8 9 The court found the
defendant had forced the plaintiff to take leave early in her pregnancy
because it was concerned that her teaching while she was pregnant
and unmarried "would have been a bad moral example for her stu-
dents." 90 The court pointed out that, in deciding the constitutional
claim, it had already discussed why this was not a legitimate con-
cern. 9' The court then held that, because the discrimination was
based upon pregnancy and a constitutionally protected right, it vio-
lated title VII. 92
The courts have decided, under title VII, only two cases involv-
ing discrimination by private educational institutions on the basis of
unwed pregnancy. The first such case was Dolter v. Wahlert High
School,93 in which a Catholic school refused to renew the contract of
an unmarried English teacher after she became pregnant. The de-
fendant moved for summary judgment or dismissal on two grounds,
one of which was its right under section 2000e-2(e)(2) of title VII to
impose upon its teachers a code of moral conduct consistent with rec-
ognized moral precepts of the Catholic church.94 The court acknowl-
edged that a religious employer has such a right as a bfoq defense for
religious discrimination.95 However, if it imposes the moral code
upon one sex only, it violates title VII on the basis of sex discrimina-
tion.96 The court found that the defendant's contentions concerning a
bfoq defense did not relate to plaintiff's failure to state or support a
sex discrimination claim, but to the parties' respective burdens of
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1065.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 483 F. Supp. 266 (ND. Iowa 1980).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1982) provides that it is not unlawful discrimination for a
religious educational institution to employ only persons of a particular religion.
95. Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 270-71.
96. Id. at 271.
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proof under disparate treatment analysis. 97 The plaintiff submitted an
affidavit asserting that other employees, known to have violated the
defendant's moral code by engaging in premarital sex, were not dis-
charged. 98 Her affidavit created a question of fact concerning the cru-
cial issue of whether the defendant's religious bfoq was a pretext for
sex discrimination. Therefore, the court denied the defendant's mo-
tion for dismissal or summary judgment.99
The second case involving a private institution defendant and
discrimination on the basis of unwed pregnancy is Harvey v. Young
Women's Christian Association."o In Harvey, the single female plain-
tiff was a program director who developed and implemented various
programs among teenage girls in a community-based project away
from the defendant's facility. 1 ' When hired, she signed an agreement
that she would uphold the defendant's Christian principles and phi-
losophy."°2 After learning that she was pregnant out of wedlock, the
plaintiff met with her supervisor to discuss the matter. She told her
supervisor that she could offer herself in her unmarried, pregnant con-
dition as a role model of an alternative lifestyle. 10 3 After this discus-
sion, the defendant asked her to resign. 104
The court found the plaintiff had proved a prima facie case of sex
discrimination by her testimony that she was discharged because of
pregnancy.l°5 However, the testimony of three of defendant's officials
established that she was discharged because of her expressed intent to
represent to the teenagers, with whom she worked, a lifestyle that was
contrary to the defendant's principles and, therefore, violated her hir-
ing agreement.106 Thus, the defendant rebutted plaintiff's prima facie
case by showing it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dis-
charging her.10 7  Finally, the court found that the plaintiff had not
met her burden of proving that the defendant's reasons for discharg-
ing her were a pretext. 108
At the trial level of the present case, Chambers v. Omaha Girls
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 271-72.
100. 533 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
101. Id. at 951.
102. Id. at 950-51.
103. Id. at 952.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 954.
106. Id. at 954-55.
107. Id. at 954.
108. Id. at 956.
430 [Vol. 11:4 17
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Club, Inc., 19 the district court relied upon Harvey in finding that the
OGC had shown its role model rule was a business necessity under
the disparate impact theory."' The court found that teenage preg-
nancy was contrary to the OGC's purpose of providing young girls
with "exposure to the greatest number of available positive options in
life."' It found that OGC had established its honest belief that al-
lowing single pregnant staff members to work with its members would
convey the impression that it approved of teenage pregnancy. 12
The district court also analyzed the case under the disparate
treatment theory.11 3 It found the defendant had articulated a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its role model rule, attempting to
discourage teenage pregnancy. 1 4 The court's conclusions were based
upon numerous preliminary findings of fact. 5 These findings in-
cluded: 1) the OGC was engaged in a program of pregnancy preven-
tion for at least five years; 2) the rule was adopted after two single
staff members became pregnant; 3) two club members reacted to the
pregnancies; and 4) the plaintiff was fired only because she was preg-
nant. 11 6 The court also noted the conflicting evidence of the parties'
expert witnesses. The plaintiff's expert testified that economic factors
are the primary reason for teenage pregnancy and only education can
resolve the problem. The defendant's expert agreed, but, testified that
in her opinion, role modeling could be another way to attack the
problem. 1 17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
viewed the lower court's business necessity determination under the
clearly erroneous standard of review.11 8 In so doing, it quoted the
lower court's findings of fact regarding business necessity. It also
noted that the lower court had relied upon the defendant's expert tes-
timony "to the effect that the role model rule could be helpful in
preventing teenage pregnancy."119
Chambers argued that the district court's business necessity find-
ing was clearly erroneous because the role model rule was based solely
109. 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
110. 629 F. Supp. at 950.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 946-48.
114. Id. at 947.
115. Id. at 945-46.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 951.
118. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 702. See supra note 15.
119. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 702.
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on OGC's speculation and had not been validated by any studies
showing its relationship to the purpose of preventing teenage
pregnancies. In response, the court stated that validation studies are
not required to maintain a successful business necessity defense.
1 2 °
Chambers also argued that the lower court's conclusion that
there were no less discriminatory alternatives was clearly erroneous.
The appeals court disagreed, noting that a leave for the purpose of
keeping Chambers out of contact with members while she was visibly
pregnant would be much longer than the OGC's customary leaves of
up to six weeks.1 21
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit next
reviewed the lower court's findings under the disparate treatment/
bfoq theory. The court reasoned that, if the same standard, "manifest
relationship," 122 applied to both the business necessity and bfoq de-
fenses, then the lower court's findings with respect to one would apply
to the other. Having already concluded that the finding of business
necessity was not clearly erroneous, the court felt compelled to hold
that the role model rule was also a bfoq.
123
Judge McMillian dissented,124 pointing out that the district court
and the majority accepted, without any supporting empirical evi-
dence, the defendant's assumption that the presence of unwed preg-
nant instructors was related to teenage pregnancies.1 25 The dissent
supported its position by citing three public school cases rejecting the
role model defense as speculative.' 26 Finally, the dissent argued that,
120. Id. (citing Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1983)).
121. Id. at 703.
122. Id. at 704.
123. Id. at 704m05.
124. Id. at 705-09 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
125. The dissent pointed out that the district court relied upon "questionable anecdotal
incidents" to support the rule. Id. at 707.
The district court had found that:
The rule was also adopted in response to the reaction of a fourteen year old Girls
Club member (Sheila Brown) stating that she wanted to have a baby as cute as Mar-
chese (Melanie Well's baby) and that shortly thereafter Ms. Brown did become preg-
nant. And, the rule was adopted in response to the reaction of another member, Sue
Miller, who became upset when she learned of Ms. Price's pregnancy ....
Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 945.
Chambers rebutted these incidents with the testimony of Sheila Brown and her mother
that Sheila's pregnancy accidentally resulted from relations with her steady boyfriend and was
altogether unintended. Brief for Appellants at 7, Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 834 F.2d
697 (8th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1447).
126. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 707-08 (citing Avery v. Homewood City Bd. of Educ., 674
F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.
1975); Ponton v. Newport News School Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1986)).
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even if OGC had proved a defense, it still could not prevail because
Chambers had shown there was a less discriminatory alternative. The
OGC's personnel policy provided pregnancy and illness leaves up to
six weeks and longer leaves upon approval of the board.'2 7
The same judge dissented, along with two others, from the denial
of Chambers' request for a rehearing en banc.128 They emphasized
that the bfoq defense should be limited to the pregnant worker's abil-
ity to perform the duties of her job. 29 Otherwise, there is no way to
insure that pregnant workers will be treated the same as other em-
ployees "not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work."1 30
The Chambers decision illustrates the need for clear guidelines
for the application of the supposedly narrow bfoq defense to claims of
sex discrimination. Despite the fact that Congress has clearly stated
that title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,13
the court found that role modeling justifies firing an unwed pregnant
worker. This finding was based on nothing more than the defendant's
beliefs, the unsupported opinion of the defendant's expert, and two
anecdotes.' 32 The Supreme Court set the precedent for such a result
when it sought to narrow the application of the bfoq defense by the
circumstances of the employment rather than adhering to the lower
courts' requirement of a factual basis showing that substantially all
women are unable to perform the work at issue. 33 The "circum-
stance" standard allows the exclusion of women from employment on
the basis of stereotypes about them. The experts' opinions in
Dothard 131 were based upon the unsupported assumption that women
are more vulnerable to sexual assault than men. 135 Whether or not
the court acknowledges it, implicit in the role modeling bfoq is the
assumption that unwed pregnant women are immoral. 136 As long as
the courts are willing to base decisions on unsupported opinions, Con-
gress' intent that women not be excluded from employment on the
basis of stereotypes about them will be thwarted.1 37 To avoid this
127. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 708-09.
128. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 585-86.
130. Id. at 586.
131. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 112, 119, 125 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
134. Dothard, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977).
135. See Note, supra note 30, at 134 n.229.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
137. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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result, courts should require demonstrable proof of the justification
for sex discrimination. 1 38 Otherwise, it is time for Congress to further
clarify that discrimination on the basis of sex includes unmarried as
well as married women.
Judith Elane
138. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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